In pretext cases, "the issue is whether either illegal or legal motives, but not both, were the true' motives behind the decision." 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Once the consideration of race in the decisional process had been established, we held that "the burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result." at 1113. 1202 (D.D.C. Because the Court of Appeals required Price Waterhouse to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the improper motive, rather than merely requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence as in Mt. . . [Footnote 2/1] The plurality's analysis of verb tense serves only to divert attention from the causation requirement that is made part of the statute by the "because, of" phrase. The plurality claims that the present tense excludes a but-for inquiry as the relevant standard because but-for causation is necessarily concerned with a hypothetical inquiry into how a past event would have occurred absent the contested motivation. Transgender Legal Defense & Education Fund Opposes Amy Coney Barrett’s Confirmation to the United States Supreme Court ... and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which protected people from sex-based stereotyping in employment and formed the basis for numerous lower court opinions protecting LGBTQ employees. Indeed, he went on, "[n]one of the other partnership candidates at Price Waterhouse that year had a comparable record in terms of successfully securing major contracts for the partnership. We do not understand the dissenters' dissatisfaction with the District Judge's statements regarding the failure of Price Waterhouse to "sensitize" partners to the dangers of sexism. Of the 88 persons proposed for partnership that year, only 1-Hopkins-was a woman. The plurality's reliance on the "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) provisions of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 100 Cong.Rec. The Court rejected a rule of causation that focused "solely on whether protected conduct played a part, 'substantial' or otherwise, in a decision not to rehire," on the grounds that such a rule could make the employee better off by exercising his constitutional rights than by doing nothing at all. sex. The Court's allocation of the burden of proof in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 626-627, 107 S.Ct. The U.S. Supreme Court case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins established the legal precedent of sex stereotyping that also applies to Ms. Stephens’ wrongful termination. 450 U.S., at 253, 101 S.Ct., at 1093. 15. See n. 3, supra. In my view, such a system is both fair and workable, and it calibrates the evidentiary requirements demanded of the parties to the goals behind the statute itself. [4]. 31); a third advised her to take "a course at charm school" (Defendant's Exh. The Court's attempt at refinement provides limited practical benefits at the cost of confusion and complexity, with the attendant risk that the trier of fact will misapprehend the controlling legal principles and reach an incorrect decision. The evidentiary rule the Court adopts today should be viewed as a supplement to the careful framework established by our unanimous decisions in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), and Texas Dept. 490 U.S. 228. See ante at 490 U. S. 250, n. 13. Hopkins. Today's opinions cannot be read as requiring factfinders to credit testimony based on this type of analysis. The part of the statute relevant to this case provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-. 450 U.S. at 450 U. S. 256-258. The District Court also based liability on Price Waterhouse's failure to "make partners sensitive to the dangers [of stereotyping], to discourage comments tainted by sexism, or to investigate comments to determine whether they were influenced by stereotypes." The plurality seems to say that since we know the words "because of" do not mean "solely because of," they must not mean "because of" at all. ante at 19, and that this "is not an imposition of liability where sex made no difference to the outcome,'" ante at 490 U. S. 246, n. 11. "tainted" by awareness of sex or race in any way, and thereby effectively eliminates the requirement. Co., 191 Wis. 610, 616, 211 N.W. , 99 F.3d 1078, 1084 (11th Cir. Respondent was a senior manager in an office of petitioner professional accounting partnership when she was proposed for partnership in 1982. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the court concluded that even if a defen-dant’s actions were shown to have been mo-tivated by racial animus, the defendant could still defeat Title VII liability by proving that it would have taken the same adverse action even in the absence of the illegal animus. Critics of the bill that became Title VII labeled it a "thought control bill," and argued that it created a "punishable crime that does not require an illegal external act as a basis for judgment." Healthy City Bd. 2622, 2631, 77 L.Ed.2d 89 (1983), quoting Los Angeles Dept. See also ante, at 259-260 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). Id. See ante, at 250, n. 13. According to Price Waterhouse, an employer violates Title VII only if it gives decisive consideration to an employee's gender, race, national origin, or religion in making a decision that affects that employee. We have described the relevant question as whether the employment decision was "based on" a discriminatory criterion, Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358, 97 S.Ct. The very uncertainty as to what might have happened opens the door wide for conjecture. The interpretive memorandum, whose authoritative force is noted by the plurality, see ante at 490 U. S. 243, n. 8, specifically provides: "There is no requirement in title VII that an employer maintain a racial balance in his workforce. The employer's proof on the point is to be presented and reviewed just as with any other evidentiary question: the Court does not accept the plurality's suggestion that an employer's evidence need be "objective" or otherwise out of the ordinary. Healthy, the District Court found that the employer was motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate factors. At this point, Ann Hopkins had taken her proof as far as it could go. Our decision in Texas Dept. In my view, nothing in the language, history, or purpose of Title VII prohibits adoption of an evidentiary rule which places the burden of persuasion on the defendant to demonstrate that legitimate concerns would have justified an adverse employment action where the plaintiff has convinced the factfinder that a forbidden factor played a substant al role in the employment decision. We sit not to determine whether Ms. Hopkins is nice, but to decide whether the partners reacted negatively to her personality because she is a woman. What did the U.S. Supreme Court determine in the case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins? Because the class has already demonstrated that, as a rule, illegitimate factors were considered in the employer's decisions, the burden shifts to the employer "to demonstrate that the individual applicant was denied an employment opportunity for legitimate reasons." W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 265 (5th ed. 321, 340, 825 F.2d 458, 477 (1987) (Williams, J., dissenting). 263 U.S.App.D.C. The judge went on to decide, however, that some of the partners' remarks about Hopkins stemmed from an impermissibly. See, e.g., Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1320-1324 (1985) (en banc) ("discernible factor"). Where a decision was the product of a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives, however, it simply makes no sense to ask whether the legitimate reason was "the `true reason'" (Brief for Petitioner 20 (emphasis added)) for the decision -- which is the question asked by Burdine. As Dean Prosser puts it, "[a]n act or omission is not regarded as a cause of an event if the particular event would have occurred without it." As these examples demonstrate, our assumption always has been that, if an employer allows gender to affect its decisionmaking process, then it must carry the burden of justifying its ultimate decision. Justice BRENNAN and Justice BLACKMUN concurred to stress that the plaintiff could prevail under the Burdine scheme in either of two ways, one of which was directly to persuade the court that the employment decision was motivated by discrimination. It can hardly be said that our decision in this case is a departure from cases that are "inapposite." The courts below erred by requiring petitioner to make its proof by clear and convincing evidence. I agree with the plurality that, on the facts presented in this case, the burden of persuasion should shift to the employer to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision concerning Ann Hopkins' candidacy absent consideration of her gender. McDonnell Douglas and Burdine assumed that the plaintiff would bear the burden of persuasion as to both these attacks, and we clearly depart from that framework today. specifically found that Hopkins had "played a key role in Price Waterhouse's successful effort to win a multimillion-dollar contract with the Department of State." The plaintiff who engages the services of Dr. Susan Fiske should have no trouble showing that sex discrimination played a part in any decision. 1109 (1985), and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. I read the opinions as establishing that, in a limited number of cases Title VII plaintiffs, by presenting direct and substantial evidence of discriminatory animus, may shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant to show that an adverse employment decision would have been supported by legitimate reasons. The structure of the presentation of evidence in an individual disparate treatment case should conform to the general outlines we established in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. By any normal understanding, the phrase "because of " conveys the idea that the motive in question made a difference to the outcome. By any normal understanding, the phrase "because of" conveys the idea that the motive in question made a difference to the outcome. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 77 (1963) (emphasis added). Instead, the Court outlined the following approach: "Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed upon respondent to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that his conduct was a 'substantial factor' or, to put it in other words, that it was a 'motivating factor' in the Board's decision not to rehire him. discrimination, subtle or otherwise." The specification of the standard of causation under Title VII is a decision about the kind of conduct that violates that statute. See 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 400, n. 5. 263 U.S.App.D.C., at 333-334, 825 F.2d, at 470-471. In addition to the statistical evidence presented by petitioner in that case, we noted that the State's "selection procedures themselves were not racially neutral." The language of Title VII and our well-considered precedents require this plaintiff to establish that the decision to place her candidacy on hold was made "because of" sex. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975). Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U. S. 977, distinguished. Thus, we shall remand this case so that that determination can be made. As the dissent points out, post, at 287, n. 3, the interpretative memorandum submitted by sponsors of Title VII indicates that "the plaintiff, as in any civil case, would have the burden of proving that discrimination had occurred." See, e.g., Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Trial by Jury: Proposals for Change, 73 Va.L.Rev. This is nothing more than a label, and one not found in the language or legislative history of Title VII. Ante at 490 U. S. 244-247. 321, 333-334, 825 F.2d 458, 470-471 (1987); see also Toney v. Block, 227 U.S.App.D.C. Summary: Hopkins was female. I believe there are significant differences between shifting the burden of persuasion to the employer in a case resting purely on statistical proof, as in the disparate impact setting, and shifting the burden of persuasion in a case like this one, where an employee has demonstrated by direct evidence that an illegitimate factor played a substantial role in a particular employment decision. But see ante, at 239, n. 3. Senator Case, whose views the plurality finds so persuasive elsewhere, responded: "The man must do or fail to do something in regard to employment. Aikens illustrates the point. As a general matter, Judge Gesell concluded, "[c]andidates were viewed favorably if partners believed they maintained their femin[in]ity while becoming effective professional managers"; in this environment, "[t]o be identified as a women's lib[b]er' was regarded as [a] negative comment." Yet it goes on to state that, "an employer shall not be liable if it can prove that, even if it had not taken gender into account, it would have come to the same decision. See Aikens, supra, at 714, n. 3, 103 S.Ct., at 1481, n. 3 ("As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or circumstantial evidence"). (KENNEDY, J., dissenting), with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240, 96 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). The plurality's first statement therefore appears to indicate that an employer who considers illegitimate reasons when making a decision is a violator. This does not follow, as a matter of either semantics or logic. "(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (allocation of burden dispositive because no evidence of which of two negligently fired shots hit plaintiff). Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. Ante, at 242. Hopkins thus failed to meet the requisite standard of proof after a full trial. The inquiry that we describe thus strikes us as a distinctly nonhypothetical one. The plurality tries to reconcile its approach with Burdine by announcing that it applies only to a "pretext" case, which it defines as a case in which the plaintiff attempts to prove that the employer's proffered explanation is itself false. `` departure from the McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 460 U. 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